THE CONCEPT OF MODERNIZATION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE XVIII CENTURY

Article examines views and current conceptions of theory of modernization applied to the so-called “Eastern societies” and more to the Ottoman Empire as the most prominent non-European political actor and one of few states that survives the domination of the “West” during XIX century. Due to its origins in 1960’s, theory of modernization encompassed wide and numerous ideas, theories and concepts in desperate attempt to clarify, how backward and generally weak, comparing to its Eastern neighbors-rivals European civilization (mainly Western European) became economically and so force politically stronger and suddenly turned the tables, enslaved almost all the world for century. Europeans created new or renovate old institutions (frequently in spite of themselves) to become fitter than their competitors in worldwide struggle for wealth, both political and economic. Theory of modernization tries to explain when, how and by whom these changes were incentivized. It took a few decades to create various and rarely views depends on scholar’s scientific methodology and research methods, ideological preferences and ethnicity. Simultaneously, such European-based theories were applied to the non-Western societies due to find out the reasons of their second-rate positions, which appeared obvious to anyone in the last quarter of the XIX century. Author tries to apply a methodic instrument given by theory of modernization to analyze the process of reforms in XVIII century Ottoman Empire and what their efforts in political, economical and moreover mental spheres lead them into a trap of vicious circle of reform. The main question, were the innovations, provided by Ottomans a simple westernization (in the meaning of mindless compilation of European-created institutions) or in was straight purpose to emulate “Western” societies – to become stronger and sufficient, using their own resource and methods.

**Keywords:** East, Ottoman Empire, modernization theory, historiography, Eastern question, industrial society.

According to a historiography, the end of the XVIII and the whole XIX century became the watershed in the development paths of the Western European societies. They faced the challenges, which, by strange reasons, were not noticed by anyone, excepting the comparably small group of Enlighteners, who in a matter of fact were the bellman of its urgent changes. Straight after the French revolution and Napoleon Wars, industrialization came along, bursting the processes, which in the result created the modern type of industrial society. Well aware, that phenomenon of reforms and reformation were known long before the fact of modernization, it had an extended profile, and interpreted in different ways, with numerous meaning and aims [1, c. 7-8].

The aim of recent article is to analyze the basic points of modernization theory and world-system theory in appliance to social and political development of the “Eastern” countries, with deep scrutiny of the Ottoman Empire as the main exponent of the “East” in view of the Europeans.
Goal of the article is to make an attempt to create general theoretical scheme of modernization struggle in Ottoman Empire during the XVIII century.

One of the main and most controversial issues in contemporary humanities is modernization theory – amount of theories, which tries to model how societies transform into a complex and comprehensive organism. Such a theory has numerous interpretations depending on sciences, methodology and researcher ideology, and so far historical fluctuation of a term itself [2, c. 241-242] and his derivatives: modern, modernity, etc. Nowadays, the core meaning of modernization as a process broke a boundaries of strictly scholar phenomenon and interpreting vastly and dubious, often incorporates disproportionate concepts [3, c. 10], and in historiography, still is abusing by twisting the meaning of it by European-centered view of accordance of Eastern societies to a Western social scales [4, c. 30]. The derivatives notions of modernization concept became highly popular both in social sciences and in theory and practice of governmentality, in order to justify reformism and modernization as an ultimate state reason [5, p. 17-19].

In broader sense – modernization theory alongside with formation and civilization theories are considered as a major macro sociological theories [6, c. 217], which are used by historians to explain the comprehensive social developments and changings throughout large periods of time and on the vast territories. However, as any social concept, there are no sole way to define modernization, and this complex matter is characterized by multiple indicators [7, c. 156], but in general, it shows the way how traditional societies become contemporary [8, c. 154-155]. Oxford dictionary of sociology reduces modernization to the process of adjusting society to its urgent needs and current challenges [9]. Apocritical understanding of modernization as progress of society due to industrial revolution and industrialization, which one set up economic, political and social changes [10].

A bit simpler assumption defines modernization as technological shift from agrarian to industrial mode of production with respective changes in political and social structures and other aspects of life [11, c. 61]. The “cultural approach” supports admit, that modernization is essential removal of basic cultural elements and principles – born summation of knowledge, skills, abilities and information [12, c. 6]. Nevertheless, American researcher Dean Tipps points that a lot of fellow-scholars are often make starkly extremes in defining modernization and how it works – one notes that modernization is way typical and unilateral social action, another one – that modernization is a process of implementation of features which make society modern [13, p. 203]. Jan Keller emphasize an economic, scientific and intellectual levels of modernization as to be the most representative, but makes a warning about its humanitarian, social and ecological aspects, the same goes with unexpectedness of modernization’s results [14, c. 49-52]. The key factor of modernization is recognized to be a process of rejecting or substituting the old values that are impediment to a social changes and rapid economic growth [15]. Allmost every country on a planet survived modernization in that way or another, but it often became “westernization”
The most highlighted features of modernization, commonly regarded as conventional are: technological progress, industrialization and mass production, urbanization, radical increase of national wealth, mass literacy and education, further actions of people in political processes, appearing of media, vertical social mobility and meritocracy, struggle for national identity and so on. Meanwhile, for the Eastern states modernization became to be not only westernization or contemporarity but harsh, ruthless and painful actions to provide necessary reforms in socio-economic sector to create western oriented standards of life, despite Shmuel Eisenstaedt thought that modernization in a planet scale reduced only to a changes in Western European countries throughout XVII-XIX centuries, and elaborated brisk debates on “emulation theory” (catching up/ forging ahead in evolulotional economic theory) by William Mechta and a processes of aware alterations presented by Wilfred Smith on Indian data.

In case of European renovation where the all actions were done upon the theses of well govern state in which power measures by wealth and justice that governed there [15, c. 138-139] and social mechanisms efficiency, that could solve all problems and moving whole society forward by making hard but inevitable compromises, composing optimal balance between innovations and traditions, create lineage between political organization and economic relations that includes control upon income and outcome [16, p. 603, 624]. Muslims thought that European luckiness were direct result of secularization, that took political power from clericals [17, s. 78-79].

The most radical adepts of historical sociology, in that way or another, has questioned the basics of changes that moved societies forward and determine the inceptives of this changes as: violence and coerce (as Charles Tilly), wandering counterbalance in opposition between European elites throughout a long time, which happened in spite of themselves (as Richard Lachmann). Peter Shtomka highlights that modernization of Europe was quite ambiquity process, which rather characterized by possibility than necessity, achievement rather than immanency [18, c. 120]. Nevertheless, modernization (westernization) in it’s essence happened synchronic with industrialization, secularization and nationalis, which appeared with modernization or outstrips it, provoking or being its immediate result. There is an opinion, that Western countries were winning their imperial race just because they managed to create and fix their political institutions in order to modernization quests – nation state, and any modernization attempts in the East without the exact schedule, were episodically and led only to a catastrophe [19, c. 45-46].

Anyway, modernization as like an every theoretical concept is rather conventionality and can’t be unquestioned truth for concrete actions and prescriptions, but could be used as investigation guideline to understanding and scrutiny the Western experience, finding out it’s components, complexity,
problemacy, dynamics and human factor [20, c. 3-4]. Also I’m deeply allegiate to the position of English historian Christopher Bayly, who looked upon period of 1780-1914 as the creation of New World, where one of the crucial aspect of modernity was the self-establishing modernity itself [21, p. 10]. The core of modernization was in Western Europe, but the same very processes lasted in Asia and Africa, and didn’t concede European analogues or even surpass them. This means, that it going to be scientifically prejudice to reduce modernization only to it European version.

Research of modernization processes in the Near Eastern region is concentrated on external incentives, which of course, led them happened and through the nation-prism of all nations incorporated into a social system of Ottoman Empire [22, p. 243].

My attention is applied on the problem of modernization of Ottoman Empire, on it’s reason to be the most powerful non-western state at the beginning of the XIX century and maintain its independence despite continuous struggle with inner and outer enemies. State officials had a notional knowledge about the reforms provided in European’s to clearly adopt them, the same went with reasons, that stimulated the reforms [23, p. 1]. Ottoman Empire is still being attributed to rigid state systems, which couldn’t or didn’t want to change in order to the matter of time. Ottomans is vociferously interpreted as war-society, that every possible innovation is used only for war purposes due to it imperial expansion [24, c. 111]. A comparable amount of researches, harshly misused Samuel Huntington’s thesis about «Turkish phenomenon» where modernized or westernized elite-minority fights traditional-oriented majority, and this battle rip off the country. And even in contemporary Turkey imperial and religious biases are just existing undercover [25, c. 125, 127.]. It were created numerous well-evidenced theories that enlights inability of Ottomans in particular and the whole Islamic civilization in general to adapt western type of development due to mentality issues, lack of tolerance, criticism, rationalism, flexibility and free-mind [26, c. 100].

Modernization of the Ottoman empire is still problem for scholars to define. Turkish historians cant mark its beginning, dating it by the start of the XVIII century [27, p. 237], or Tanzimat period or even the 1870’s, when term Westernization/Batılılaşma became popular and intellectually crucial among the Ottoman political and social establishment, that used Meiji Japan experience of reconciling traditions and reformism [28, p. 33-34]. There are critical thoughts on the whole period from 1718 – the beginning of The Age of Tulips/Lale devri till 1876 – Abdulhamid II accession to power as later implications of kemalist historiography, led by direct purpose – to show the willing of Turkey to choose a western. It begins with the Tulip Age as the integral part of European reformation processes [29, p. 5], but still reforms and changes in Ottoman state appeared long before notorious events of 1839, as classical narrative teaches [30, p. 5]. It’s been emphasized that Ottomans were aware of practically all theoretic and practical innovations. That appeared in Europe since the XVII century, from translations of Europeans works and trying to solve their problems within ottoman’s social philosophy paradigm [31, s. 6]. Also there is a large
part of common sense in notion that any new, any innovation wouldn’t be spotted by people until the proper moment, but this tiny details will insensibly prepare society to engaging the massive and direct reforms [32, s. 129].

Simultaneously, the investigation of eastern societies’ modernization is faced obstacles in methodology in face of pitiful state of primary sources and their qualitative analyze and interpretation of its social influence [33, p. XIII-XIV]. That’s why, any research on reforms in Ottoman empire should be derived from the principle of multiply modernization theory, formed by Shmuel Eisenstaedt, David Roshmeyer and especially Norbert Elias [34, c. 67]. Let us keep in mind that “The owl of Minerva spreads its wings with the dusk” and researches will always have immanent problems, dealing with explaining of such a complex and ambiguous terms and concepts by the mean of present, and as for the Ottomans, interrupting to an interesting but highly controversial discussions [35, p. 17]. To sum up, the essence of modernization, free from aforementioned theoretical database must emerge from sustainable development, renovation and optimization of existing social, political and economic mechanisms, adjusting its parts without indoctrinating qualitatively new and distinctive from previous course models.

I’m gonna stop on facts and historiographical analyses and creating the general scheme of state development of the Ottoman empire throughout XVIII century with stress on period of 1754-1774 in attempt to prove it was modernization. The “Crises” which Ottomans have faced after signing the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 were marked as “The Age of Retreat” cause more questions than answers. In XVII century, leading alims (we may call them public intellectuals of their era) Ayni Ali, Katib Çelebi and Koçibey Gümürci identify the first marks of decreasing of the political situation in the Empire (by the way the first treaty that alarmed the malfunction of Ottoman empire was written in 1541 – the undoubtedly climax of Ottoman power [36, p. 44] is also presenting us the pitfalls of this question) [37, c. 41]. The weakening of Ottoman state, which is often attached to a Suleiman Kanuni’s unfortunate son – Selim II (1566-1574) [38, p. 59]. State officials insisted that according to political tradition and Islamic social philosophy society is stable in case everyone fits his rightful place in it. For makes this structure balanced, it ought to find out the problems within it – social structure and relations [39, p. 89].

From the other hand, XVIII century is marked by creating and strongly implementation of “Eastern decline” discourse in European political thought, which can be explained by national struggle of subjugated folks and continuously growing European hegemonies [40, p. 5]. But Ottomans treated such an ideas as temporary problems, and didn’t take them seriously. However, modern historiography suggests that adaptation and borrowing during a certain period have become a sign of flexibility and pragmatism of the state, not its decline [41, p. 194]. Ottomans relatively quick realized the necessity of changes even in the major crucial aspects and this activity will be going throughout all XVIII century from reforms to preserving the “raison-d’être” of the state [42], and in fighting against ongoing and
growing in Ottoman’s opinion European pressure, but in the fact, Europeans have already faced structural political diversification and Ottomans abandoned practicum of Gazavat and in broader sense using theology for wartime propaganda for a while [43, c. 49], still war continuos with temporary success for both sides, but in the end unfavorable to Ottoman Empire. During this, progress in some particular spheres such as military organization, tactics and war industry gave Europeans some kind of advantage, growing from yearly [17, s. 103]. It ultimately made possible to change foreign policy agenda towards Ottoman Empire to evidently rapacious manner (especially faire for Austrian and Russian empires) [44, c. 12]). Ottoman’s tried to catch-up and focused on features they attributed as vital or emulating European experience, non-mentioning revisited old and trusted authors, that wrote about state managing [45, s. 321]. The key spheres were challenged be described as:

- Military
- Control and communication
- Restoring tax-system
- Municipal control
- Bureaucracy
- Increasing Sultan’s political impact [46, p. 485]

However, general course was based upon reliable examples in economics, monetary politics and social [47, s. 52]. Notwithstanding seemingly well backed-up theory and willing to put it into practice, ottoman government did not clue the main flaw in their plan – unbearable practicism and lack of strategic view. Their desire to accomplish know-how was dictated by strictly utilitarian and urgent interest, here and now, with now or little understanding about far reaching points of their actions. The showiest image of such actions was in a military technologies, firearms, mining, cartography, watch and compasses industry, which has been implemented by Ottomans with large time span [48, p. 77].

Chronologically first and comparably well source-backed comes “The Tulip Age/Lale devri” period, which marked a turning point in state development [49, c. 74] (stricto sensu especially this period claimed to be the first and significant cultural invasion of West values and leisure and more interesting reform ideas into Ottoman society, with the most visible side – sultan royal life and Istanbul wealth groups. Tulip Age consists of praising European art and design, adopting the most innovative and unusual art tricks, tulip mania, thriving of ottoman artisans and handicraft, and further political turns under the reign of Ahmed III (1703-1730). Alongside with the Sultan, new Grand Vizier Nevşehirli Ibrahim paşa provided greater activity in contesting ordinary Ottoman warfare, implementing Western weapons and organization, and more valuable – began to encourage the debates among the alims (Ottomans intellectuals) the idea of necessity of the reforms and changing religious attributes in government affairs [50, s. 12]. Tulip age became the rare moment of cultural and secular upraising, where whole capital city flowered up with monstrous amount of gardens, streets where crowded, cafes became centers of public and
political debates (the same as in London), creating stronger tights within different social groups of Ottoman society. Such a situation was quickly apprehended by feisty officials and every kind of adventurers who tried to gain a popularity, becoming, in the manner of speaking, new cultural heroes [38, p. 86]. Age of Tulip period is bright also by smooth change of power continuity. Before that, each Sultan gain power after death or murder of his predecessor and fratricide. Tulip age invented political upraising, that could possibly overthrow Sultan and legalize it by using sheyh-ul-Islam`s fetva to legalize peoples decision as another way to power shift. Ahmed III became the pioneer of such a process, when Patrona Halil – dodgy dealer, cafe-owner and janissaries` henchman caused rebellion, that lead to intronizing a new Sultan and decapitating his predecessor for crimes against common people (despite official historiographer Muhammed Subhi described that episode not in such bloody way, even routine one, insisting that Ahmed abdicated in favor of his son Mahmud by his own will, with no threats) [51]. This event is interpreting as fights for power between political groups and signalize the weakening of central power for the one hand, as for another – the appearance of democracy elements, that linked duality of Sultan`s rule, religious norms and public loyalty [52, p. 59].

Period from 1730 to 1789 is less scholarly developed due to scarcity of sources and so force avoidance by researchers [53, c. 510], but still, there are no evidence that political agenda in attempts of state transformation and its results quoting Ahmed Ataulla, who described the reign of Mustapha III (1757-1774) supposedly on his own words: «World has turned upside down, with no hope for better in our reign, blasphemy gave power to despicable people, our officials are marauding on the streets of the City [Istanbul] , and there is nothing else left, only begging for God’s mercy » [54, p. 67]. In historiography the image of Mustapha III and his brother Abdulhamid I did nothing to reform the Empire [55, p. 6], this thesis can`t be absolutely right, but still, the essence of reforms didn`t changed. Sultans in a row Mahmud I (1730-54), Osman III (1754-57), Mustapha III (1757-74), and Abdulhamid I (1774-89) provided the very same artificial changes without breaking the paradigm (but where then any paradigm?) – creating a new type of society and boost modernization.

The bulk of reforms were brought to life by Selim III (1789-1809), who`s reign proceeds when juridical mechanism of power began to stuck [43, c. 58]. The scale of Selim`s diversifications can be judged by the title of collective work edited by Seifi Kenan: “Selim III and his era from Ancien Regime to New Order”. Such a label can be easily understood by Europeans with tight connections with French counterpart. Despite great activity in creation of European understands diplomatic service, and the most crucial – warfare (notorious Nizami Cedid – “New Army”) all seemingly good intentions of Selim went up with smoke.

In contemporary historiography Selim is praised only for successful suppression of Arab tribes mutinies, first Serbian revolution and Anatolian beys upheavals [56, s. 713] and emphasizing two major aspects, which constitute the famous Selim`s
successor – Sultan Mahmud II legacy: control over Empire’s periphery and struggle against fanatical traditions [57, p. 8]. There were two real ways for Selim III to realize his ambitions: to provide reforms at all costs, or to fight against local notables and tycoons to preserve the legitimacy of central power. The stakes were done on the first option, which finally led to Selim’s assassination in 1808.

During Selim rule, interactions between state and public firstly became a public matter (sorry for such tautology) [58, p. 1]. His reign appeared to be in perplexed times of dissolution of old imperial system and creating new entity, which will exist the next 150 years.

Conclusions. All political measures taken between 1703 and 1808 (prior to Mahmud II ascending), could be judged upon the paradigm, that had in its pinnacle the aim of renewal of Ottoman war power [50, s. 12]. Depending on researcher position it could be interpreted as modernization or westernization. Nevertheless radicalism of such changes gives us right to call them systematic and comprehensive. [53, c. 504]. The main controversy and ongoing fallacy I that Ottomans thought it will be enough just to copy European’s most advanced technologies and institutes, put them in to Ottoman practice, but they went wrong pretty soon. They didn’t realize or unwilled to admit that this changes were adjusting to a new coming social and political realities, which stroked Europe in spite of Europeans To my view, the contradictions of this political movement towards renovation leis in striking entwine of rulers political power and will to save the country through painful process of reforms and traditional Ottoman political and social structure. It requires ability to negotiate, taking steps back, if it needs, coordinate with all social actors. but Europeans didn’t have such problems according to Wilhelm Roscher’s “Enlightened despotism” which pay no attention to no one ideas or necessities except those, which leads to creation of New State.
Appendix. The “vicious circle” of Ottoman reformism in the XVIII century.
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Чалий А. Концепція модернізації Османської імперії у XVIII ст.

Стаття висвітлює процеси реформування Османської імперії впродовж XVIII століття з позицій «теорії модернізації», яка, зважаючи на наукові і ідеологічні позиції другої половини ХІХ століття, мала на меті використання магістральній шлях розвитку суспільства незалежно від його історико-культурної чи цивілізаційної специфіки – від бідності до багатства, від політичної розпорошеності до створення модерної нації. Робиться спроба змоделювати загальний шаблон розуміння і впровадження владою необхідних реформ для успішної конкуренції Османської держави із європейськими країнами. Робиться насоло на двозначності самої концепції, і що з самого моменту виникнення як дослідницької гіпотези, теорія модернізації увібрала в себе велетенський масив різноманітних ідей, теорій та припущень, суперечливих та все ж існуючих у соціальних науках, зокрема історії, що намагаються дати відповідь на питання як країнам Західної Європи, що загалом були слабшими від своїх неєвропейських суперників, вдало здійснено комплекс заходів по оновленню, чи то пак здійснено подібний тип організації суспільства, що дозволило країнам «Заходу» взяти у другій половині ХІХ століття бути абсолютними світовими лідера в усіх можливих галузях. В статті робиться акцент на соціальній видозміні Османської імперії впродовж XVIII-XIX століття, коли численні спроби поступових реформ в окремих сферах, пов'язаних з першою із військовою справою, засвідчили намагання правлячих верхівок османів здійснити комплекс соціальних реформ для надоложення втраченого людства на геополітичні арені. Робиться спроба обережної оцінки даних явищ для відповіді чи були ці зміни модернізацією чи «вестернізацією» (при відзначенні суперечності даних термінів), аналізуються фактори які сприяли й заважали процесам модернізації та які створювали замкнене коло, без розриву якого будь-які якісні зміни були б неможливі. Наголошується на тому, що зазначений напрям реформ зводився до намагання зміцнитися до європейських інституцій, улітів та реалій, зберігаючи османську самобутність.

Ключові слова: Схід, Османська імперія, модернізація, історіографія, Східне питання, індустріальне суспільство.
Чалый А. Концепция модернизации Османской империи в XVIII в.

В статье исследуется процесс реформирования Османской империи в XVIII веке с позиций совокупности взглядов на типологию развития обществ в Новое и Новейшее время получившее комплексное название «теория модернизации», и объединяющая в себе множество разнообразных подходов и гипотез на суть качественных преобразований, что привели к созданию обществ современного типа — индустриальных и частично постиндустриальных, создав современное государство, нации и экономику. Анализируется комплекс обоснований, каким образом и благодаря чему западные общества смогли призвести качественный рывок вперёд и во второй половине XIX века доминировать по всей планете, хотя до этого уступали Азией цивилизациям и государствам по всем основным параметрам. Основная проблема, почему обществам условного «Востока» не удалось такое же, несмотря на наличие всех необходимых элементов. Суммируется и характеризуются сами реформы и полученная модель используется в качестве методического инструмента в приложении к обществам «Востока», а конкретно к его репрезентативной части — Османской империи, что в XVIII веке после ряда существенных военных и политических поражений вступила в полосу «упадка», продемонстрировала желание к переменам и частично привела их но так и не смогла создать полноценный новый социально-политический организм для успешного противостояния западноевропейским странам. Характеризируется процессы политических, военных и экономических пертурбаций, происходивших при правлении одних из самых неизвестных султанов — Махмуда I (1730-1754), Османа III (1754-1757), Абдулхамида I (1774-1789). Автор пытается ответить, были ли эти преобразования вестернизацией — пустым и бездумным копированием европейского опыта, или османские власти пытались эмулировать европейцев — приравнять к европейским институциям и даже превзойтить их на основе собственного опыта и ресурсов.

Ключевые слова: Восток, Османская империя, модернизация, историография, Восточный вопрос, индустриальное общество.