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## “THE CLASH OF THEORETIZATIONS”: THE CASE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE XVIII<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY

*Article deals with some common theoretical questions and theories regarding the Ottoman Empire as an interesting matter to prove them right or wrong, and how they work on particular historical material. For such reasons several key theories will be used: modernization theory, world-system analysis, divergence theory, historical sociology, class struggle theory, another point of view is Ray Dalio's concept of “big curve” and economic cycles theory, depicted in Clement Juglar, Tugan-Baranovsky and Nikolai Kondratiev works along with Oded Lagor's theory of unified growth. Author tries to imply how these theories explain or could explain the magistral way of development in the XVIII century and how Ottoman history is comparable to other states. Main results are next: from modernization theory prospects Ottomans faced couple short periods of what we can call modernization (improvement or reestablishing institutions and the way they perform their strict duties) during the “Tulip Era” (1703-1730), during major confrontations with European powers (1750-1770) and by the beginning or reign of Selim III from 1789. All those endeavors were different in spheres, lasting and methods, but pursuing one goal – to emulate European experience using Islamic and strictly Ottoman background – creating a well-organized state, able to withstand Europe. Due to world-system analysis in the XVIII century Ottoman Empire inadvertently lost its superpower status, diminishing to regional power. Also, they shifted from semi-periphery to periphery, a process which has been proceeding for all of the XVIII century and ended in 1839. From a sociological point of view, Ottoman society began to polarize – both in territorial and functional ways. Territorial – local elites began to grow in wealth and question central government power, creating local myths, dealing with non-Muslim and tribal minorities. Functional – due to absence of large-scale industrial manufacturing and consequently absence of middle class in European view, Ottoman trading elites profited as mediators for Europeans and consequently didn't grow as “Third power” to provide pressure on their government. Ray Dalio's “big curve” concept was chosen due to its nearly absence in current research, and it is shown that it is too abstract and uses non-qualified criteria to make any probable conclusion, whether state is fine or on the verge of collapse. Economic activity cycles concept shows that Ottomans situated in the wholesale trend of the XVIII century – diminishing prices for grain and rising activity in the credit sphere.*

**Keywords:** Ottoman Empire, XVIII century, modernization theory, world-system analysis, historical sociology.

**Introduction.** Researchers always like to make broad generalizations on various specters of past events, processes and turning all objects upside down to reach exact and firm information based on sources and their right interpretation. This path is curious and fruitful in many ways, but in case of losing strict theoretical and empirical ground could lead to non-verifying assumptions that could distort perceptions of the past events and their development. Nevertheless, such broad generalizations could provide a grand-scale picture of investigated matter, which can

in future be partialized by blocs, using special historical (or better interdisciplinary) methods.

**The aim** of this article is to check how different social and historical theories contribute to a quite hard task — explaining the Ottomans XVIII<sup>th</sup> century development and its consequences. As such going to be included: World-system analysis (next WSA), Marxist historical analyses, historical sociology, modernization theory, the theory of economic cycles and its subsequent item – the unified theory of growth, introduced by Israeli-American economist Oded Galor, divergence theory and “Big Curve” theory by Ray Dalio.

**Methodology** is embodied in aforementioned theories: **WSA** – product of Immanuel Wallerstein, written in his numerous researches emphasized that the main feature of analysis is “world-system”, not national state and such division embodied in strict political, cultural and economic assets, which obey certain systematic rules and being called “world-system” [1, p. 16-17]. Where the world is divided into core-semi-periphery-periphery depending on trading mode, level of economic development and foreign intervention. More bold and explanatory thesis of Wallerstein is: “...the three presumed arenas of collective human action aren't autonomous, they don't have separate logic. More importantly the intermeshing of constraints, options, decisions, norms and rationalities in such that no use research model can isolate factors according to the categories of economic, political and social and treat only one kind of variable, implicitly holding the others constants” [2, p. 134]. Otherwise, the world-system encompasses all human activities and facts of their lives, which determines political relations worldwide, hierarchy and role of every country in it.

**Marxist theory** due to its recognition and description in numerous theoretical and empirical works I will not scrutinize.

**Modernization theory**, that one, which never passes away despite being criticized from its very beginning [3, p. 96] makes accents on social development and societies` complexity and general movement from traditional to modern society. Term “modernity”/“modernization” occurs quite oftenly and encompasses a lot of assumptions and theories, seldom, opposite or tautological [4, p. 68]. Its beginning ties with Industrial revolution and widely industrialization throughout the world, but even till XIX century remained incomplete, precarious, and deeply contested [5, p. 55]. Main notion that deconstructs modernization theory and makes it semi-usable for the early modern period is that it applied to European/North American route to modernization and based on concrete empirical material and criteria [6, p. 171-172], and overall conditions, absent in the Ottoman Empire (liberal democracy, industrialization etc.), which is thought to be inextricably bound with term modernization [7, p. 44-46]. Indeed, theoretical battles between scholars upon possible “Ottoman modernization” is going for the last 60 years with changeable success [8, p. 127-128]. In my research I will try to apply Shmuel Eisenstadt's theory of parallel modernization or multiple modernity to Ottoman realities [9]. Main

obstacle is highlighted by Barış Mücen: “...I showed throughout this study that doxa of modernization does not just lie in the unquestioned character of these categories, but more importantly in the generalization of the reality identified as “modernization” to all of historical change. In other words, I showed how the limits of an objective reality (of power and capital) constituted the limits of a sense of political and historical reality. The doxa of modernization shared by the heterodoxies analyzed consists of a reliance on this sense of reality; thus, as summarized in more detail below, while the heterodoxies produced different accounts of this reality, they did not question its particularity” [10, p. 187-188].

**Historical sociology** is an umbrella term for numerous methods of interpreting historical events in terms of sociology, keeping in mind the notion of Anthony Giddens, “that there simply are no logical or even methodological distinctions between the social sciences and history — appropriately conceived” [11, p. 14]. As an object, historical sociology tends to search for the roots of social changes, mobility of institutes to modeling its future [12, p. 11-12].

**Economic cycles theory** was invented in the XIX century, but widely used and reinforced in the XX century by Russian economist Nikolay Kondratieff to explain main features of long-lasting economic changes and laws behind it, how economic activity in specific sectors defines sustain economic growth and lead to general increasing of productivity. Particular obstacles of such theory for recent article’s research field is that it investigates and explains capitalistic/modern economic realities, however, the Ottoman economy was whatever but not capitalist in a strict sense, despite some claiming it to be proto-capitalist or clearly pre-modern (subtle title to agrarian type of economy). Even for relatively well-backed economics (USA, England, France etc.) in source aspects, we have more or less clear evidence to use not earlier than for the late XVIII century [13, p. 6]. Next to this, I can only hypothetically use its elements to trace possible ways and solutions to Ottoman economic history. Ray Dalio’s concept of a big cycle tries to explain the “great powers” rise and fall. He emphasizes on 18 criteria, composed in 3 big cycles, through which you can say in what part of development any nation is at the current moment [14, p. 63-65]. The most plain and reasonable explanation of economic cycles theories and prospects is given by Romanian economists [15, p. 49-50]. The Marxist model sees two causal paths being systematically generated by these relations – one operating through market exchanges and the other through the process of production itself – whereas the Weberian model traces only one causal path; and the Marxist model elaborates the mechanisms of these causal path; in terms of exploitation and domination as well as bargaining capacity within exchange, whereas the Weberian model only deals with the bargaining within exchange. In a sense, then, the Weberian strategy of class analysis is nested within the Marxist model [16, p. 26-27].

**Results.** Despite being independent and considerably strong state, Ottomans in the end of XVIII century and in the beginning of XIX century as well, oriented as minor

productive state, copying (unwillingly) the economic policy of colonies or semi-colonies, when Western states provided the sparks of industrialization under protection of heavy trade tariffs [17, p. 16-17].

Immanuel Wallerstein separated the Ottoman Empire, Mughal Empire and Europe as distinct World-systems, and Ottomans and Mughal wasn't capitalistic [18]. Andre Gunder Frank is also right to point out that Europe remained peripheral or semi peripheral vis-a-vis Asia until at least the eighteenth century [19]. At the same time, we can find an excuse to put Ottomans into the periphery straight from the 1700s [20, p. 72].

Due to its strategic defeats during the XVIII century, the Ottoman Empire began to shuffle from regional power (which made an impact on the whole Middle East, and part of Europe) to a solely local state that weighs heavily only in the Middle East. It is clear to me that in the period 1750-1873, the capitalist world-economy included Russia, the Ottoman Empire, India, West Africa, and perhaps other areas as peripheral zones (or a semi-peripheral zone in the case of Russia). My own largest area of uncertainty in relation to the Ottoman Empire is whether its peripheralization should be dated from the nineteenth (or late eighteenth century) or from the early seventeenth century [18, p. 392]. Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas Hall identify world-systems as inter-societal networks that are systemic. By "systemic" authors mean that they exhibit patterned structural reproduction and development [21, p. 4], and due to their analysis Ottoman Empire could be described as tributary in the mode of allocation and re-supplying resources – Commercializing state-based world-systems in which important aspects of commodification have developed but the system is still dominated by the logic of the tributary modes [21, p. 43-44], despite hypothesis of Ottoman capitalism [22], but nevertheless all WSA theory has its own shortcoming and criticize from ignoring realities of peculiar states, in our case the Ottomans: "...regarding the 'periphery' (or 'traditional societies') as stagnant and shorn of any life, dynamics and therefore, history. In this perspective, the peripheral societies such as the Ottoman society do not have the potential to be the actor of change. This perception lacks an interest in or entails ignoring internal dynamics and precisely for this reason, the world system analysis falls short in understanding the process of change in the Ottoman Empire and the dynamics behind it" [23, p. 106-107].

Disagreements between Braudel and Wallerstein on the one hand and Frank, Gills, Wilkinson, and ourselves on the other about whether or not the Ottoman Empire was systematically connected with the Europe-centered system can be resolved by studying the connections by the information, prestige-goods, political/military, and bulk-goods networks separately [21, p. 249]. There are arguments that the Ottoman Empire cannot be taken as a full-fledged example for the AMP – arguments which are gaining strength together with the new studies enlightening the political, social and economic functioning of the Ottoman society [24, p. 4].

Seeking solutions for its revival while facing strong foreign adversaries paved the way for elite modernization and renewal. In the XVII<sup>th</sup> and XVIII<sup>th</sup> centuries “the Ottoman rulers looked at the indigenous solutions” and believed they could limit their “reform-imports” to Western technology, keeping a distance from cultural aspects. This proved impossible, the Ottomans facing, by the end of the XVIII<sup>th</sup> century, the need to transplant institutions, political and even philosophical infrastructure from the West [25, p. 61].

First, upswings and downturns do not mean the same for cores and peripheries within a division of labor characterized by small- and large-scale inequality and dependency, secondly, focusing the spatial impact of long waves on the geography of cores and peripheries allows for embedding economic cycles into so-called hegemonic cycles [26, p. 61-62], that for the XVIII century wasn't fair even for Mughals India, where Europeans only began to erect their struggle for dominance, not mentioning Ottomans. Other thought puts Ottomans into a Global South already in XVIII century after the process of first Great Divergence [27]. In case of Kondratieff long waves, they are partially fit to Ottoman Empire case due to its chronological constraints, that reached only the last decades of XVIII century 1780-1790 years, when empirically proved the beginning of upward movement in World-Economy [28, c. 29, 56].

After long time, Ottoman historiography at last switch from the narrative of “weak and downfallen state” to more realistic and complex depiction of Ottoman Empire: adoptable, aware of the last European innovations, with constant attempts (nevertheless successful or not) to keep up with changing world [29]. The key pattern that emerges from these series is low and fluctuating central revenues without an upward trend in the early modern centuries followed by rapid gains in the nineteenth century. Ottoman central revenues were only marginally higher in the 1780s in comparison to the 1560s. In contrast, they increased by more than fifteenfold between the 1780s and World War I. The historiography of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has argued that the challenges Ottoman central administration faced on fiscal and military fronts were related to the absence of monopolization and centralization of military forces. Instead, along with their growing role in tax farming contracts and allocation of extraordinary *avariz* taxes, major ayan families in different parts of the empire formed their own retinues with firearms. These forces played an essential role in enforcing tax collection at the local level and also provided leverage for the ayan when they bargained with the central administration over tax contracts and for privileges in exchange for joining the army during periods of war and suppressing local banditry [30, p. 594, 617].

Due to fit Ottomans into an Ibn Haldun theory of social change (with famous 5 phases) alongside with notion of Malcolm Yapp, who argues that the term the “Sickman of Europe” is a term developed by orientalists, which was exaggerated by western writers, to create the impression that the Ottoman Turks were in decline. But Malcolm Yapp argues that it is just a fantasy of western historians and western

diplomats. Even Yapp argued, until the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries. Ottoman Turkey was a country that was undergoing **reform** (!). The Ottoman Empire was able to carry out reforms and improvements needed in various fields, such as military reform, administrative reform, and strengthening power in its various regions. This is an extraordinary achievement. Yapp even made an opinion that what should be questioned is not why the Ottoman Turks were defeated, but why the Ottoman Turks were able to survive so long. Yapp's opinion makes us a little aware that the stagnation phase is not a phase of decline, but the stagnant phase is the phase in which the Ottoman Turks survive by maintaining what their predecessors have produced as well as possible. Of course, this requires tremendous effort. The Sultans of the Ottoman Turks managed to carry out this phase quite well. They succeeded in maintaining the unity and sovereignty of the Ottoman Turks from the threat of the enemies of the State 3. And still had great political, economic, and military power at that time. This is generally very much by the fourth phase in Ibn Khaldun's theory of 5 phases of the development of a state [31, p. 13].

The Ottoman Empire saw a period of recovery and stability in the eighteenth century and managed to survive into the modern age with most of its central institutions intact, while its contemporaries in Asia failed. But at the same time, some dangerous rings rang when status-quo in the mercantile system changed, because no particular religious group dominated commerce in the Ottoman Empire until the early eighteenth century. However, by the nineteenth century, various communities, particularly Greeks and Armenians, constituted a large part of the empire's commercial and financial life, and towards the end of the eighteenth century, they had completely replaced the Dutch — the most powerful merchants in Mediterranean [32, p. 2].

The somewhat improved wellbeing of the elite groups boosted their consumption of luxury goods, which, in turn, stimulated long-distance trade and strengthened the World-System connectivity, thus contributing to technological exchange and progress (especially in the domains of shipbuilding and navigation), and economic growth. Eventually, consumption of luxury goods gave impetus to the Age of Discovery, as a result of which the global world was formed. Furthermore, not only the elite, but also the emerging middle class enjoyed GDP per capita growth from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. The middle class then consisted of highly qualified laborers, craftsmen (carpenters, tailors, watchmakers, etc.), lawyers, doctors, and so on [33, p. 56].

The eighteenth century witnessed restoration and growth after the Global Crisis. However, in contrast to the nearly universal growth of the sixteenth century (especially in its first half), eighteenth-century growth was highly uneven. This unevenness formed the basis for one of the most important global phenomena observed in the eighteenth century, namely the Great Divergence between the successfully developing Global North (the European states, Russia, East Asian states – China, Korea, Japan – and the North American colonies) and the Global

South, which was not as successful. The phenomenon of the Great Divergence is fundamentally important in the context of global history because it largely predefined the subsequent division of the world into developed countries and developing countries, as well as the structure of relations in the global world in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries [33, p. 88]. The bottom line of economic prospects of Ottomans are not very bright, because despite total growth Ottoman economy grew only for 30% in all the XVIII century [33, p. 97, 100], it means average 0,3% per year which is typical for preindustrial economies.

XVIII century marks the last bastion of Ottoman pragmatism, which was unlike the previous one in XVII century and definitely other than XIX century, showing the last institutional effort in such direction being secular religion, grand ideologies, and the political visions of the different parties, groups, or classes are not determining factors for defining the nature of the ottoman polity (they are dependent variables, in the jargon of political science and comparative politics). State centric — it emphasizes the problem solving capabilities of state institutions over other social, political, and economic agents and institutions, and it tends to portray the state almost as a monolithic institution, its offer new periodization and poses himself as nativism in core [34, p. 202]. If the empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was suspected of being in decline, in the eighteenth century it was indisputably so [35, p. 197-198].

The political point of view centers in Ottoman reformism, which goes within the global Islamic movement of the tajdid movement opposed to both the rigidities of the schools of law and the cultic aspects of shrine-Sufism [36, p. 464].

All misconductions, cruelty and failures were brought up under the umbrella term of “Oriental despotism”, in which Ottoman Empire was the most prominent example, due to its geographical closeness and long interaction with the European world [37; 38].

The European polity that consistently outdid all rivals in this context before the late eighteenth century was England – not by virtue of the country’s unique individual liberties, but of the country’s precocious institutional unification [39, p. 37]. If one measure of a modern state lies in its ability to centralize and monopolize the control of violence, the Ottomans failed to make the transition in the eighteenth century. They also failed to design a fiscal system as well-organized as their European foes around the business of war, another of the characteristics of European states of the same era [40, p. 12].

The chief hypothesis is that Ottoman reformers were faced with the necessity of modernization, but could not commit themselves to more than reform [41, p. 452]. The meaning of modernization or modern itself will always be doubtful, with regard to scholarly mindset [42, c. 21]. Other aspect is assumption of “civil society” in the Ottoman Empire (in meaning of non-government coalitions). In general, two different types of organizations are included in studies of Turkish civil society: associations *derneks* and religious endowments *vakıfs* [43, p. 5]. Despite this, the Ottomans faced

no “civil society” because of restricted individuality and their economic, cultural and administrative dependence on the center [44, p. 9] whatever he meaning of this term can be pointed for the XVIII century, the explanatory “ad-West” is also not satisfactory, because western countries had the same processes and realities as Ottomans had. Based on the political culture we can easily trace down the mix of political, social, class, religious and even cultural divisions of Ottoman society. In theory, such intermediary institutions as cities, guilds, religious institutions, and local ‘notables’ were important units of mediation between the state and society, and thus contained civil societal elements. In practice, they provided only a vague potential for civil society within the Ottoman sociopolitical order and presumably, in spite of themselves, could have formed a basis for civil society. [45, p. 68, 75]. Accordingly, many of the existing IHS accounts rely extensively on a narrative, in which European capitalism instantaneously and irreversibly transforms the empire, seemingly without any form of intervention by or interaction with domestic actors, conditions and structures [46, p. 21].

In the context of Zenonas Norkus’ historical sociology of empire (specifically in case of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania), Ottomans were assigned to the “primary empires” to at least the second half of XIX century. The defining modes of such an empires were/ “embodiment of form and essence”:

- They have a proper organization both to administer and exploit the economic, political, religious or ethnic variety.
- Empires establish systems of transportation which ensure military and economic connections of the centre (metropole) with the periphery.
- Empires have sophisticated systems of communication, which enable direct administration of subordinated areas from the center, e.g., regular postal systems.
- A policy of territorial expansion and stability of limes (after the end of expansion stage). The stabilization of the ‘limes’ is determined by encounter with other empires or strong powers or by certain ecological boundaries (mountains, steppes etc.). Territorial expansion may be also stopped because of the calculations of ‘grand strategy. An imperial idea or project, which eventually turns into shared values that overcome local differences.
- Empires surpass other co-existing political entities in terms of population and/or territory [47, p. 20-21].

As a result of such Western influences that debilitated the revenues and war making capacity of the Ottoman state, the Empire went through a profound process of decentralization in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in direct contrast with its contemporary European counterparts [48, p. 96].

This, in turn, means that the process itself will work in a ‘catching up’ mode. Initially, the undertaking to copy European models does not meet its goals and the Empire falls under the pressure of its own incapability to produce, develop, govern, and expand its territory, to adapt to modern means of warfare, and to resist the



western societies and their evolving industrialization [49, p. 194]. Ottomans found itself in an era of European time and confronted by a European discourse of progress that paved the way for an Ottoman orientalism [50, p. 778].

*“Unified theory of growth”* was introduced by Oded Galor in an attempt to encompass all activities (especially small ones and unhinged) to create one general theory that will explain the general pattern of a country’s growth. Unified Growth Theory suggests that the transition from stagnation to growth has been an inevitable by-product of the process of development. It argues that the inherent Malthusian interaction between the rate of technological progress and the size and composition of the population accelerated the pace of technological progress and ultimately raised the importance of education in coping with the rapidly changing technological environment. The rise in industrial demand for education brought about significant reductions in fertility rates. It enabled economies to divert a larger share of the fruits of factor accumulation and technological progress to the enhancement of human capital formation and income per capita, paving the way for the emergence of sustained economic growth. The theory further explores the dynamic interaction between human evolution and the process of economic development and advances the hypothesis that the forces of natural selection played a significant role in the evolution of the world economy from stagnation to growth [51, p. 16]. Galor divides all development into three types or regimes: Malthusian, Post-Malthusian and Sustainable Growth. Main criteria of development lie in technological progress, capital accommodation, human capital, GDP per capita and relation between growth and wealth distribution [51, p. 17-18]. Due to these points, the XVIII century Ottoman Empire is just invalid for evaluation (though Galor makes his analysis on Western European countries and not even mention Eastern) next to absence of clear and exact data and absence of above-mentioned economic features themselves as for the XVIII century. Major publications for economic history of the Ottomans GDP per capita counts only from the 1820s [52], and any calculations for the XVIII century is still hypothetical. Technological process was unstable even for Western Europe, but till the beginning of the Industrial revolution in the 1780s Ottomans were clearly backward next to Europeans.

For the last feature Ray Dalio’s concept should be examined. The reason for taking such work is the general absence of new ideas on international relations and particularly Ray Dalio’s popularity. For the record, Ray Dalio is not a scholar, he is a hedge-fund analyst, in his book *“Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order: Why Nations Succeed and Fail”* which has been published in 2021, he tried (or more obviously his advisors and co-authors, referents) to trace the general principles of rise and fall of world-orders depending on particular country characteristics up to total 18 elements or determinants: **“three big cycles”** – debt/money/capital markets/economic cycle, big cycle of internal order and disorder, big cycle of external order and disorder. **“Key elements”**: education, innovation, cost competitiveness, military strength, trade, economic output, markets and financial

sector, reserve currency status, and “**additional**”: geology, resource allocation, acts of nature, infrastructure and investment, character/civility/determination, governance/rule of law, gaps in wealth/opportunity and values [14, p. 64-66].

Next to these characteristics there are a few notions. Firstly, half of them are irrelevant for XVIII century realities. Secondly, the other half is just immeasurable and unable to validate. Thirdly, if we don't put any words, criteria and characteristics into a term, everyone can judge them based on their own specific understanding and different meanings. Fourthly, each of these criteria don't give any explanation of how it works, like if any criteria is marked “enough” it's not guarantee any profit for the state in its role and place in international relations structure. Like education — for the XVIII century educational level in all countries worldwide was low, maybe for Ottomans it was lower, but Europeans did not gain any superiority from it. Innovations — XVIII century industrial revolution generally went unnoticed for its contemporaries. Military strength — small Prussia was able to resist combined forces of Russian and Austrian Empires. Economic output is highly debatable as for the XVIII century the distinction between most and least economically developed was in ratio 2:1 [53, c. 19]. Other criteria are just irrelevant and even absurd for the XVIII century.

The roots of such inconvenience is that Dalio in his text makes an example of “declining power of USA” and “rising power of China”, for the XX century and further. Nevertheless, the scholar's inconsistency of his method gives inadequate analysis, which brings to life results that never exist.

**Conclusions.** The Ottoman Empire in the XVIII century went through numerous tasks and dangers. A lot of events may seem chaotical and unstructured, but in reality, these events have always been conducted according to the laws of societal development and didn't come out of nowhere. I tried to prove that the “twilight” of the Ottomans in the XVIII century could be described in terms of historical and sociological theories and the excerpt theory of international relations as world-system analysis. 4 theories were brought under scrutinize upon ottoman material:

**WSA** – during the XVIII century Ottoman Empire began to swiftly shuffle from status of structural power (that was able to impose its actions on various countries and continents) to mere regional power, even this status was shrinking to just the Middle East and Africa and Balkans. Ottomans were incorporated into the capitalist world-system and lost their own, and got a status of a semi-periphery.

**Modernization theory** – due to modernization Ottomans failed to capitalize their potential into creating qualitatively new social units, economic structure, that would ensure their take-off and emulating western features.

**Marxist theory** – during the XVIII century social struggle in the Ottoman Empire began to rise with greater force. Economic stability makes political struggle between central and local powers less painful and created new forms of exploitation (*iltizam*), guilds and artisans couldn't keep up with European economic intervention and began to degrade in skill and manufacturing, shrinking of market and income created

heavier paying duties for taxpayers. Next to the term of marxist political economy Ottomans were still a feudal imperialistic state that didn't have enough military capabilities to expand and gain resources, but did not change its productive force and relations to change the economic paradigm.

**Historical sociology** – brings the first glimpse of early capitalism social order that was highly intertwined with previous feudal. Ottoman society was still based on the religious, ethnic, social and political division that, nevertheless, wasn't so rigid and let anyone achieve one's goals, but couldn't match with Western type of social organization.

**Economic theories (big cycles, unified theory of growth)** – these theories have little explanation of Ottoman realities, but show a clear downward trend of keeping backwardness with an asymmetrical trade pattern.

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**Чалий А. “Зіткнення теоретизувань”: Османська імперія у XVIII ст.**

У статті аналізуються основні соціологічні теорії й концепції стосовно Османської імперії XVIII ст. її політичного, економічного, міжнародного життя. Основні теорії які будуть використовуватися в рамках фактологічного матеріалу: модернізаційна, світ-системна, класова, дивергенційна, історичної соціології, концепція “Великої кривої” Рея Даліо, економічних циклів, описаних згідно методології економічних циклів. Метою статті є перевірка теорій османською практикою і вироблення загальної теоретичної лінії розвитку держави Османів у XVIII ст. Виявлено, що Османська держава пережила у XVIII столітті низку змін, які, на перший погляд були не дуже помітні сучасникам, але які визначили подальший розвиток держави на десятиліття вперед аж до середини кінця XIX ст. З точки зору модернізаційної теорії Османська держава зазнала кілька етапів змін, які вже й так докладно досліджені в історіографії: “Епоху тольпанів” (1703-1730), модернізаційні потуги 1750-1770-х рр., правління Селіма III (“Нізамі-Джедід”) – які намагалися скопіювати й дорівнятися до європейських інститутів у намаганні відновити військову могутність і вдало протистояти наступу європейців. Через цілу низку причин як суб’єктивного так і об’єктивного або реального характеру ці спроби не дали того результату, який очікували його впроваджувачі, а обмежилися лише певними здобутками, які структурно мало змінили османську державу. Згідно теорії економічних циклів – османи потрапили в низхідну тенденцію ділової активності (як і інші країни), але через структуру економіки та економічну політику зазнали більших збитків, що вплинули на соціальну сферу. З точки зору марксистського аналізу османи залишалися феодальною країною з яскраво вираженим військово-експансіоністським елементом. З точки зору світ-системного аналізу – до кінця століття османи міцно закріпилися в статусі держави напівпериферії, знизивши свій статус до регіональної держави в кращому випадку. З точки зору історичної соціології – османське суспільство почало поляризуватися як територіально (через зростаючу роль місцевих верхівок та пониження влади центрального уряду) та функціонально (через відсутність індустріалізації та асиметричності торгівлі й неадекватності економічної політики влади в османів так і не виник виробничий «третій клас»). Окремо варто виділити концепцію Рея Даліо, яка хоч і відносно популярна в журналістських та наукових колах, але не може слугувати науковою теорією через неперифікованість та понятійну розмитість критеріїв.

**Ключові слова:** Османська імперія, XVIII століття, модернізація, історична соціологія, світ-системний аналіз.