Modern Challenges to European Security and Expert Assessments of the Nuclear Threat Posed by the Russian-Belarusian Alliance
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Abstract
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Kremlin’s nuclear rhetoric has become a constant element of its strategic pressure on the West. Simultaneously with military defeats on the battlefield, Moscow has increasingly resorted to demonstrative escalation – particularly through the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons (hereinafter TNWs) on the territory of Belarus. This development marked another step toward deeper integration of Minsk into Russia’s military-political orbit.
This article analyzes available Western reports – including those from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the RAND Corporation, NATO documents, U.S. intelligence (DNI), and analytical publications by the CSIS – which indicate that Moscow employs nuclear blackmail as a tool to pursue two major goals: exerting pressure on Western governments to limit support for Ukraine, and transforming Belarus into a subordinate platform without formal annexation.
The paper also highlights the role of TNWs as instruments of psychological and diplomatic pressure. The Kremlin seeks to create an impression of inevitable military escalation in case of imminent defeat – in particular, through the permanent stationing of a non-combat nuclear contingent on the territory of formally independent Belarus. According to RUSI and RAND assessments, Russia’s strategic model resembles a new form of hybrid occupation: a satellite state is used as a nuclear platform without having a voice in decision-making.
It is argued that the nuclear presence of the Russian Federation in Belarus should become an object of strategic response by the Alliance, rather than merely a subject of monitoring. Ukraine, in the context of enhanced cooperation with NATO and its own experience of resisting Kremlin aggression, should initiate its own proposals for responding to the deployment of TNWs in Belarus. Furthermore, the evolving situation in Belarus demonstrates that modern forms of occupation may occur without formal invasion – through nuclear coercion, information absorption, and the erosion of strategic sovereignty.
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