German Eastern European Policy and the “Policy of Memory” (1969-2022): Misapprehension of Eastern Europe

Abstract

The article is dedicated to the evolution of the German “new Eastern policy” (1969-2022), which determined its foreign policy guidelines in recent decades and was considered one of the most successful projects after the SPD came to power. The external and internal conditions for the implementation of the “new Eastern policy” in the 1960s and 1970s were considered. It was found that this policy had two stages. At first, its main priority was an attempt to solve the “German-German” question. Later, the “new Eastern policy” turned into a conservative “Realpolitik”, which focused on solving national issues in its second stage from the 1980s. This resulted in cooperation with communist regimes in Eastern Europe and neglect of democratic and opposition movements. After the unification of Germany and the collapse of the USSR in 1991, this policy did not undergo significant changes and was automatically transferred to modern Russian Federation. Rationalism, which prioritized profitable trade, led Germany to economic dependence on Russia. The article proves that Ostpolitik was closely related to the German “politics of memory” in terms of its responsibility for the victims of the World War II. Ignoring Eastern European countries in foreign policy led to the relativization of responsibility for their victims, and compensatory practices were extended to modern Russia, which was identified with the former USSR. This created “white spots of the gap” in the “politics of memory” and public space.