“We can’t Trust the Russians”. “The Stalin Note of 1952” on Neutrality and the Unification of Germany

Abstract

The article is devoted to the USSR’s diplomatic notes of 1952 sent to the governments of the United States, Great Britain and France with proposals to resolve the so-called “German question” after the World War II (1939-1945). The problem of a divided Germany turned into a pan-European issue in the first post-war years, but it also determined international relations in “the West-East” complex. The USSR’s proposal to unite the country with a neutral status sparked public debate, even though the solution to this issue remained in the hands of the Western allies. Public discussions of the Soviet proposals formed the myth of “lost opportunities”, which has become a German historiographical phenomenon. The myth of “lost opportunities” was a product of the chancellor’s authoritarian management style on the one hand, and internal confrontation with political opponents – social democrats – and numerous public nationalist groups on the other.

The article attempts to reveal the general context of international initiatives to resolve the German question; the strategic vision of the Allied powers on the issue of a united Germany; analyses Soviet proposals and responses of the Western Allies; and outline the reaction of German politicians, who contributed to the myth of a “lost opportunity” for the country’s unification. The author concludes that the discussion of Soviet proposals in Germany influenced the development of the strategy of the “new eastern policy” in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when the ruling Social Democrats led by W. Brandt concluded that this process could be successful only in cooperation with the USSR. Time has proven that there is no alternative to Germany’s economic and military Western integration, and the myth of “lost opportunities” today remains only a means of theoretical exercise.