U.S. Policy Toward Ukraine: On the Path to Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion (February 2014 – February 2022)

Abstract

The policy of the Obama administration toward the Russo-Ukrainian war established a strategic course that, despite tactical adjustments, was largely preserved during the presidencies of Donald Trump and Joseph Biden, up until the outbreak of the full-scale invasion. This course was based on the acceptance of the doctrine of Russia’s “escalation dominance” and on the provision of security assistance that was limited in scope and defensive in nature.

Domestic political and interagency debates in Washington regarding assistance to Ukraine were effectively reduced to the narrow issue of supplying Javelin anti-tank missile systems. This focus obstructed a systematic discussion of other military capabilities critically important for Ukraine – above all, air and missile defense systems, main battle tanks, fighter aircraft, and long-range strike capabilities.

The sanctions imposed to raise the “cost” of aggression for Moscow failed to generate a meaningful deterrent effect. In strategic terms, this model of pressure did not reduce Russia’s incentives for escalation, as it was perceived by the Russian leadership as an acceptable and manageable price for pursuing priority geopolitical objectives.

The disengagement of the United States from the Minsk process not only strengthened the negotiating positions of the Russian Federation but also exposed a fundamental contradiction in American leadership in Europe. A gap emerged between Washington’s declared role as a guarantor of European security and its actual avoidance of responsibility for resolving the most significant security crisis in the region since the end of the Cold War.

The deterrence policy pursued by the Biden administration on the eve of Russia’s full-scale invasion proved ineffective as a tool for preventing aggression, as it failed to alter Putin’s strategic determination to resort to the use of force. At the same time, it was relatively successful as a crisis-management mechanism: it ensured the rapid consolidation of the West and created the institutional and political foundations for large-scale, coordinated international support for Ukraine after 24 February 2022.