Iran’s Role in the Iraq War of 2003–2011: U.S. Miscalculations and Lessons for Ukraine

Abstract

The article analyzes the strategy of the U.S. administration during the Iraq War of 2003–2011. Particular attention is given to the miscalculations in understanding Iraq’s internal political situation, the underestimation of Iran’s role and the disregard for the objectives of the actors involved in the war.

The study explores how the misconceptions of Washington’s political establishment, particularly regarding Iraqi society’s readiness to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime, created a reality unsupported by facts and detached from actual circumstances. This false perception guided coalition forces throughout the 2003–2011 periods and beyond.

Substantialattention is given to Iran’s approach, which, in contrast to the U.S. strategy, was pragmatic and tactically calculated. Iran gradually gained control over Iraq's political, economic, and security structures through proxy forces and ideological influence.

The article draws parallels with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, emphasizing similar errors: underestimating the opponent, flawed analytical models, and an oversimplified view of internal political dynamics.

The text draws attention to the insufficient academic reflection on the topic within Ukraine, despite the existence of a substantial body of foreign research, which, however, often displays signs of political bias. It underlines the necessity of re-evaluating the consequences of the Iraq campaign in light of contemporary geopolitical transformations, particularly the emergence of the Russian-Iranian alliance in the war against Ukraine. An analysis is conducted of works of both foreign and Ukrainian scholars who have contributed to the study of the topic.

It was emphasized that the lessons of the 2003–2011 war must be taken into account when shaping a proactive foreign policy grounded in pragmatism and a clear understanding of national interests and strategic goals. National self-identity, religious and cultural heritage arementioned as key elements of soft power in countering external threats.

An attempt is made not only to reconsider Ukraine’s foreign policy strategy, but also to outline the direction of the transformation of Ukrainian diplomacy, with a primary focus on effectiveness, planning and rationality based on continuous analysis.